This study reviews and evaluates a particular aspect of the institution building process in the transition countries of Southeast Europe. The focus is the development of the banking sector. It is argued that banking sector development plays an integral and pivotal role in the successful completion of the transition process. It functions as a very strong integrating force contributing to the broader institution building process and as a pillar of future growth and development in the new market environment of the Balkan economies. This study concentrates on three main issues. First, it undertakes a brief literature review of regional integration approaches in the Balkans. Second, it provides an overview of the most significant changes that have taken place in the banking sector. Third, it reviews some structural characteristics and performance indicators, all of which point to considerable advancements made in this sector in recent years. Empirical evidence is provided showing that a substantial harmonisation of ownership structures and performance indicators has been achieved in the banking sectors of these countries initiating a convergence process toward EU banking structures and functions. In this regard, this study complements the findings of other studies focusing on various sectors of economic activity, which clearly show that a de facto regional and, even more so, continental integration of the Southeast European countries is under way.
Introduction
This paper intends to argue that foreign banking institutions have played a key, and in some cases, dominant role in the restructuring, reorganisation and reform of the banking sector in all Balkan economies. Their role, which continues unabated, has contributed to the much-needed institution building process as a necessary advancement leading to the completion of the transition project.
In developing this argument, this paper concentrates on the following three main issues. First, it undertakes a brief literature review of the theoretical understanding of regional economic integration as it applies to the Balkan countries 1 ;
second, it provides an overview of the most significant changes that have taken place in the banking sector since 1989; and, third, it reviews the main ownership and structural characteristics as well as some selective performance indicators which point to the most recent advancements in this sector.
Balkan Integration: Selected Theoretical Contributions
Since 1989, concurrently with a substantial number of regional economic integration initiatives launched various theoretical arguments for and against Balkan integration have been proposed and debated 2 . The relevant literature focuses on three main issues: the reasons why integration needs to be promoted, the obstacles hindering integration efforts and a critical assessment of the regional integration initiatives already implemented. Uvalic (2001) identifies four reasons for promoting regional economic integration in the Balkans. First, the need to increase mutual trade through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Lower prices would encourage greater regional trade flows and compensate for the weak export performance of Balkan states to the West. Even a transitory impulse to trade flows, Uvalic argues, may create static and dynamic gains and provide strong incentives for regional development. 1 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. 2 The initiatives towards regional co-operation in Central and South Eastern Europe arose as a reaction to two main events. First, the dissolution of the Eastern Block and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance resulted in an institutional vacuum; in response, the Central European Initiative (1989) , the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (1992) and the Central European Free Trade Area (1992) were launched. Second, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict led to a second wave of economic integration efforts with the Conference of Southeast European Countries (1996) , the Southeast European Co-operative Initiative (1997), the Stability Pact (1999) and the Stabilisation and Association Process.
Second, integration can contribute to the resolution of issues that need to be addressed at a regional level, such as migration, infrastructure, energy, ecological damage, environmental issues, illegal trafficking etc. Due to the nature of these issues, which affect the Balkans as a whole, an attempt to resolve them unilaterally can be only partially successful. Third, integration can encourage investment through greater political and economic stability in the region. A high savings deficiency, due to poverty, underdevelopment and loss of confidence in the banking system, renders the attraction of capital from abroad especially important. Regional co-operation can reduce political risk, promote economic stability and increase the size of local markets, contributing, therefore, to investment activity. Fourth, regional integration is a means through which convergence and eventual integration into the European and the Euro-Atlantic economic and security structures can be accelerated.
Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2002) elaborate on five reasons why the international community and, in particular, the EU advocate a central role for regional co-operation. First, the 'prescriptive' argument emphasizes the positive effects of regional interdependence and co-operation, referring to the EU as the most successful example of integration efforts. Second, the 'new regionalist' argument considers the transformation of the Balkans as part of a wider global effort to promote democracy and market economy through multilateral co-operation. Third, the 'strategic' argument considers regional co-operation as the main contributing factor to security and confidence-building among neighbouring states. Fourth, the 'EU internal' argument advocates the development of sub-regional co-operation (Central Europe, Baltic countries, Western Balkans) as a way of facilitating the broader and long-term EU integration process. Fifth, the 'Southeast regional' argument emphasizes the need for joint resolution of common problems and maintains that SEE countries should prove their ability to cooperate with their neighbours before building stronger ties with the EU.
A common underlying theme in the views expressed above is the political motive for the implementation of integration policies. The authors acknowledge the fact that there are strong political reasons for promoting closer economic integration in the Balkans, in the hope of enhancing regional stability, secure peace, reduce ethnic tensions and prepare these countries for their eventual incorporation into the EU.
On the issue of economic obstacles that hinder the efforts towards regionalism, Kyrkilis and Nikolaidis (2001) argue that certain limitations derive from both the demand and the supply sides of the economies of the region. In particular, demandside limitations arise from the small population size of the Balkan countries and the low levels of development and per capita GDP, which undermine their ability to exploit economies of scale. Further limitations are brought about by the constrained local demand and the shift of exports to the EU market rather than the regional one.
On the supply side, Balkan production is structured in such a way as to take advantage of its relatively cheap but adequately trained labour force and, thus, specialises in low-to-medium technology sectors. Lack of complementarity, overlapping structures of production and similarities in the comparative advantages of Balkan states reduce the potential for significant gains from inter-industry trade. Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2002:11-13) emphasize the political aspect of the obstacles to economic integration. In particular, they argue that geographic proximity, the existence of many borders and the massive displacement of population have all combined to facilitate regional co-operation in informal and, to a considerable extent, criminalised economic activities. The informal sector has hindered the normalisation of relations among countries in the region, undermined economic and political institutions and obstructed the process of regional integration.
Lopandic (2001a) also describes a number of other obstacles to economic integration efforts in the Balkans noting, in particular, the lack of tradition in multilateral co-operation and their peripheral position with respect to Europe.
Furthermore, the divergences of Balkans states in terms of their national, political and economic development hinder their foreign investment prospects and diminish their regional integration potential (Stubos 1993 The six Balkan countries seem to have fully adopted the view that the nature and character of their economic restructuring and economic integration will be determined by an economic rationality and logic imposed upon them by their EU trajectory (Stubos 1997 The increasing role of the EU in the Balkan economies is critical not only in relation to trade but also in terms of bringing about changes in institutions and policies. The peculiarity in this regard lies in the fact that, under EU guidance and financial assistance, institutions and policies in certain sectors are becoming homogenised in terms of their function, regulation and efficiency. One would assume that the establishment of a modern and viable banking system fulfils this criterion and, in turn, brings the aspiring Balkan countries a step closer to their western neighbours.
Financial Integration: A Theoretical Comment
The completion of reforms and restructuring in the banking sector is considered to be a critical and integral element of the transition process (Doukas et al. 1998; Mullineux 1998; Walter 1998) . A well developed and properly functioning and supervised banking system is a prerequisite for the development of the real economy, because it affects some of its key functions ranging from capital accumulation to the channelling of funds to households and enterprises (Allen and Gale 2000; Mishkin 2001 ).
As noted by Stepic (2004:84) , 'financial intermediation and structural changes are strongly interconnected'. A well-developed banking system can be the initiator of many other restructuring projects. It provides the confidence needed for local and foreign capital to invest in new or existing companies; it brings in know-how, technology and modern management skills; it provides the much needed start-up capital, especially to small-and medium-sized companies. All in all, a viable banking system is considered an important precondition for dynamic and sustainable growth.
The development of a banking sector seems to be also a part of a longer and broader process. Many recent studies have concluded that during the past few decades banking systems have become more globally integrated. The main contributing factors are the removal of regulatory barriers, advances in technology allowing for better management of financial institution and assets globally or regionally and the growth of the activities of multinational corporations (Berger and Smith 2003) .
The entry of foreign banks, particularly in a less developed banking market, brings with it significant benefits (Konopielko 2003; De Haas and Lelyveld 2002; Mero and Valentinyi 2003) . These benefits can be seen from the perspective of the economy as a whole or from the perspective of the banking sector itself. In the first case, the establishment and functioning of foreign banks allow a country to engage in 'consumption smoothing' and safeguard economic stability. It attracts more financial resources from the international community and induces national governments to follow more disciplined macroeconomic policies (Agenor 2001) . In the second case, as Kraft (2004) points out, the presence of foreign banks improves the sector itself by introducing new products and services and by consolidating the banking sector through mergers and acquisitions.
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the entry of foreign banks may simultaneously have some other diverse effects. While, on the one hand, they render national banking markets more competitive with positive welfare implications for banking customers, on the other hand, they reduce the profitability of domestic banks and, in a lot of cases, force them out of the market. Obviously, this kind a collateral damage is part and parcel of the consolidation process, with its own negative consequences on some depositors and also on employment (Claessens, DemirgucKunt, Huizinga 1998).
Turning our attention to the Balkans, the banking sector in the late 1990s
found itself in its worst state since 1989. After a series of consecutive crises in previous years, the sector remained underdeveloped and of doubtful reputation, while services were of poor quality and strictly limited. The level of non-performing loans was very high, privatisation efforts had failed and supervisory institutions were unable to perform their tasks. These prevailing conditions necessitated the introduction of radical and bold reforms for the sector to move forward again. At that time, the expectation and the perception prevailed in policy making circles and among the public at large that liberalisation and openness of the banking system could remedy its weaknesses and deficiencies (Bossone, Honohan, Long 2001) . Under these conditions, the large, competitive and advanced EU banking institutions, given their geographic proximity to the region, made cross-border expansion and take-overs a rational investment choice. In the late 1990s the foreign invasion of the Balkan banking sector started in earnest.
In the following section, this study reviews and evaluates developments in the banking sector since 1989. Changes of the initial, particularly turbulent period are given in a summary form, while developments since 1998 are described in more detail. Various qualitative aspects of the banking sector are illuminated as it emerged after the second round of privatisation spearheaded by foreign institutions. These developments signal a major shift in the transition process from economic reform and reconstruction to institution building. In this regard, banking sector changes contribute to the broader transition project at the national level and as a means through which Balkan economies integrate themselves both regionally and continentally.
Banking Reform
All Balkan countries, except former Yugoslavia, emerged from the communist era with the legacy of a single-bank system that performed both central bank functions and commercial transactions. A first step in banking reform was the creation of a two-level banking system, separating commercial from central banking functions.
The Balkan countries, like all other transition economies, introduced a legal and regulatory framework that followed the broad guidelines, standards and procedures of the BIS. This development was in line with the so-called Washington consensus for banking reform advocated by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (Calvo and Frenkel 1991, Caprio and Levine 1994) .
Reform of the financial sector in its initial phase advanced more in terms of quantity rather than quality. The number of financial institutions quickly multiplied through the privatisation of state banks and the establishment of new private institutions. In some countries the sector was immediately opened up to foreign interests as well. At the beginning, the nascent banking system faced serious problems. First, financial institutions found themselves functioning within an insufficiently regulated environment and, therefore, were improperly supervised.
Expansion was frequently associated with improprieties, scandals and fraudulent schemes. Second, the dubious reputation and unreliability of the new financial institutions limited their ability to attract deposits and prevented the growth of their loan portfolios. It was difficult, therefore, to develop extensive client networks. Third, state banks were compelled to carry a high number of non-performing loans accumulated as a result of the past practice of government subsidisation programmes to state-run enterprises.
The initial phase of reforms resulted in numerous bank failures, scandals and transactional irregularities which questioned the very basis and viability of the emerging system. This deterioration coincided with and, in some cases, was caused by the deep economic crises that most Balkan economies experienced between 1996 and 1998. Under these conditions, reform of the banking system 'could not be put off any more' as all major International Financial Institutions were very plainly pointing out (Köhler 2002:125; Lemierre 2002:18; Tumpel-Gugerell 2002:3) . Governments had to re-think and redesign their banking reform strategy, which quickly led to new policies aiming to liberalise and consolidate the system in an effort to guarantee its viability and sustainability. It was this new policy that ushered in the penetration of the Balkan market by foreign banks.
Some countries have gone further than others in liberalising and modernising their banking and financial systems, more often in concert with their corresponding transition pace. The following section provides a synoptic review of the most significant changes in the banking sector covering the whole transition period from 1989 to the present.
In Albania 6 , banking reform started at a slow pace. In the early 1990s, the country was characterised by very low levels of financial intermediation, an inadequate legal framework for banking operations and an extensive moneylaundering problem. The system allowed for the proliferation of unsound, speculative investment schemes promising excessive returns on deposits. These investment practices became very widespread between 1994 and 1996 leading to an acute crisis which manifested itself at the end of this period. The shock waves caused by the collapse of the so-called 'pyramid schemes', in 1997, led to a gradual and more methodical restructuring of the banking sector. Successive pieces of legislation, which were introduced following the crisis, significantly strengthened the banking regulation and supervision frameworks. Capital adequacy ratios reached very high levels, 31.5% Overall, the banking sector is fairly liquid, quite profitable and adequately capitalised.
In 2003, the capital adequacy ratio was 22.2%, way over the required minimum (12%). Banking intermediation, however, still remains low in comparison not only to the western European countries but also to other Central European transition countries.
In Romania 9 , privatisation and reform in the banking sector has proceeded more slowly than in the rest of the region. For almost ten years (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , the level of intermediation was very low, the degree of concentration high (the largest four banks controlled more than 65% of total banking assets) and the problem of non- 
Banking System Reform Index
The general review of banking developments provided above shows that reforms have proceeded at different speed in the various Balkan countries. It is also fair to say that the banking sector has transformed itself substantially in the past few years and this improvement was the result of changes in:
• the privatisation of state owned banks and the closure of insolvent institutions;
• the writing-off of non-performing loans;
• the entry of foreign banks either by establishing an autonomous presence or by taking over local banks; • the adoption of regulations according to international standards and practices; and,
• the implementation of tighter and more effective supervision exercised by the central banks and currency boards.
Many challenges lie ahead for the banking sector in the SEE countries which, overall, remains less developed relative to the Central Eastern European transition countries. Bulgaria has recorded by far the largest improvement since the 1997-8 crisis,
while FYR Macedonia and Romania have recorded very significant progress.
Reforms in Albania and in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been implemented at a slower pace, while in Serbia and Montenegro reforms were first introduced after 2001 and since then changes are proceeding quite rapidly.
Ownership Structure
The privatisation of state owned banks was a critical element in the banking reform process. In all SEE countries there have been serious delays mainly due to government reluctance, unfavourable political circumstances and general economic uncertainty. Table 4 presents the asset shares of state owned banks. While in the 1990s the privatisation process proceeded rather slowly, over the last six years it has increased dramatically. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia and Bulgaria, the asset share of state-owned banks dropped below 15%. In Albania, the privatisation of the 
Capitalisation
During the initial phase of transition, many banks became insolvent under the weight of non-performing loans, while others were kept operating with Capital Adequacy Ratios (CARs) much below 8%, the regulatory minimum according to the Basle Capital Adequacy Agreement rules. The restructuring of state owned banks and the capital injections received from their respective governments improved bank capitalisation significantly. As table 6 shows the private banks that entered the market in the following years were on average well-capitalised and maintained high CAR.
During the last six years, all operating banks -both private and public -have improved their CAR. In all countries, banks are now on average well capitalised, recording ratios well above the regulatory minimum (8%). In Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, the regulatory minimum CAR is 12%, following the severe financial crises during the 90's. The regulatory authorities in these countries are expected to reduce the minimum CAR to 8% in the near future, after the banking system has been stabilised and considered sufficiently capitalised. It is more than likely that in the near future, the CAR will fall to lower levels (albeit above the regulatory minimum) given the intention of banks to increase their lending. 
Profitability
The profitability of the banking sector, has improved steadily over the past six years. This was the result of reform implementation regarding the adjustment of nonperforming loans, the introduction of modern banking techniques and the increasing pace of credit expansion. The table below presents two indexes of bank profitability, the Return on Assets (ROA) and the Return on Equity (ROE). By 2002, both ratios had increased to the point of exceeding the corresponding figures for the average EU large banks. This was the result of selective lending practices banks and the wide interest-rate spread. In the future, banks will likely have to find new sources of profits as market conditions change. Intermediation is expected to increase together with competition between banks, leading to a narrowing of interest-rate spreads. Financial institutions should seek new sources of revenue in retail banking and in asset management, while they will try to increase market share.
Some of the key factors determining the SEE bank performance in the future are:
• controlling of operating expenses and minimising losses;
• implementation of a clear strategy to optimise capital allocation;
• introduction of new banking products and services;
• optimisation of human resources capabilities;
• introduction of modern and effective risk management techniques;
• a clearly defined segmentation of their target client base; and,
• increasing market share.
These factors are identical to those that affect the performance of banking institutions in the more advanced economies as well, and this is a clear sign as to how far the banking sector in SEE countries has come during the past few years.
Loan Portfolio Quality
During the 1990s, the banking system of the SEE countries experienced serious problems stemming mainly from the poor quality of their loan portfolios.
Most of these problems were inherited from the 'old regime', where credit risk evaluation was irrelevant, the regulatory framework was inefficient and a bank's credit policy was just a government instrument used according to the needs of the centrally planned economy (Bonin 2001:1) .
During the transition period and especially during the last six years, banking institutions took measures to improve their asset quality and loan portfolio performance. Concurrent with the privatisation and restructuring policies carried out by specially created agencies, the central banks adopted new methods, rules and regulations according to BIS standards in order to create a new and effective framework to deal with lingering functional and supervision problems. Table 8 Overall, the share of non-performing loans to the total loan portfolio is still high compared to large EU banks. The introduction of modern and more sophisticated risk management techniques and the introduction and implementation of the new Basel II Accord are two of the measures expected to improve loan portfolio quality and accelerate convergence toward the EU average.
Financial Intermediation
Financial intermediation remained low during the first decade of transition, mainly due to weak depositor confidence caused by the protracted and, in some cases, severe financial crises experienced by most SEE economies. During the same period, legal protection for depositors and deposit insurance schemes were absent. In addition, personal income was barely sufficient to cover basic needs. All these conditions combined to result in a low household savings potential and affected negatively credit expansion by banks. Additionally, during this period, lending policy was to move only slowly and carefully in the market given that corporate performance was weak, balance sheets unreliable and clients' credit history non-existent. The banks' preferred option was to invest their funds in government bonds. Table 9 presents data on the evolution of domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of the GDP. Apart from Bulgaria, where the ratio is near 20%, in all the other countries the recorded ratio is indicative of the low level of financial intermediation. Over the last six years through 2004, the level of financial intermediation has increased significantly. The deposit base has increased together with depositor confidence while adequate legal protection of the lenders, the introduction of modern credit risk management techniques and the good and more transparent performance of the business sector has led to significant credit expansion. However, financial intermediation in all the SEE countries is still low relative to the EU average.
According to a recent research conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2003:20) , the level of financial intermediation in SEE countries is also well below that of the Central and Eastern European countries. In the near future, however, as overall conditions improve, Balkan banks are expected to expand their lending activities in the retail, business and production sectors.
EU Countries' Ownership in the SEE Countries' Banking Sector
Some of the largest European banking institutions as well as the five largest Greek banks 13 and their plans to expand into that country.
The strong economic growth recorded in all the Balkan countries, the increasing financial stability, the improved corporate results, the increasing disposable income and the expansion of consumer credit provide a dynamic banking environment with favourable conditions for the operation of European banks. All of them, according to their most recent annual reports expect to increase their market share and lending activity in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
The data and information presented in this study provide strong evidence that there have been rigorous and accelerated improvements in the banking sector of the Balkan countries, particularly after the acute crises that affected them between 1996 and 2000. Our review suggests that government reforms in recent years radically changed the ownership structure of the banking system and improved performance indicators. Moreover, a very significant harmonisation of ownership structure and performance indicators has been emerging in all the Balkan countries. This manifests a common convergence pattern despite the fact that the transformation drive in each country proceeded at different speed and by different method (Buch 1996) . Overall, with the exception of a low level of intermediation, in all other respects the banking sectors in the Balkan countries resemble those of EU countries. To a great extent, this progress has been achieved because of the efforts of foreign investors. The Balkan experience shows that foreign investments, if concentrated collectively, timely and in a synchronised manner on a particular economic sector, can effectively redefine its structure and function.
Despite these significant developments in the past few years, the banking sector in the Balkans still faces many challenges. A new wave of reforms concentrating on sector consolidation through mergers and acquisitions is needed and, in some countries, is already under way. Deposit insurance schemes and loan collateral policies recently introduced are welcoming measures protecting both banks and their clients. The full implementation of the new Basel II Accord and the strengthening of the regulatory framework are also challenges requiring further action. It should also be noted in this context that the sustainability of banking sector reform in SEE countries will be determined, to a considerable extent, by the commitment of governments to implement market-oriented reforms in other sectors of the economy. Many weaknesses and problems, past and present, faced by the banking system are caused by the lack of transparency and accountability in public and private transactions, the negative consequences of the underground economy, the legacy of weak corporate governance and the lack of public confidence in public institutions.
Last but not least, there are clear signs that banking reform is already contributing to the broader objective of the Balkan countries to integrate in the EU.
Ownership structure alone reveals a de facto strong continental integration pattern.
This momentum should be seized as an opportunity by the EU to intensify the Stabilisation and Association Process of the Balkan countries instead of treating these advancements as a test ground and as a criterion for deciding their accession prospects in the distant future.
